Abstract
In the previous chapters, we have viewed practical reasoning as being a procedure for acquiring (or abandoning) conative states: While theoretical reasoning consists in moving from one’s current beliefs and perceptual states into new beliefs, practical reasoning consists in moving from one’s beliefs and conative states into new conative states. We have also seen that practical reasoning can be as rational as theoretical reasoning can be.
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(2005). The Doxification of Practical Reasoning. In: Roversi, C. (eds) A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3505-5_42
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3505-5_42
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-3387-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-3505-0
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