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Soyhun, A.K. (2005). Implications of the Distinction Between Semantics and Pragmatics for Philosophy of Science. In: Irzik, G., Güzeldere, G. (eds) Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 244. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3333-8_12
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