Assessing Trace Evidence Left by Secure Deletion Programs
Secure deletion programs purport to permanently erase files from digital media. These programs are used by businesses and individuals to remove sensitive information from media, and by criminals to remove evidence of the tools or fruits of illegal activities. This paper focuses on the trace evidence left by secure deletion programs. In particular, five Windows-based secure deletion programs are tested to determine if they leave identifiable signatures after deleting a file. The results show that the majority of the programs leave identifiable signatures. Moreover, some of the programs do not completely erase file metadata, which enables forensic investigators to extract the name, size, creation date and deletion date of the “deleted” files.
KeywordsSecure deletion trace evidence Windows XP FAT12 file system
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