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Making Conditionally Secure Cryptosystems Unconditionally Abuse-Free in a General Context

Extended Abstract
  • Yvo G. Desmedt
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 435)

Abstract

[Sim84] introduced the concept of subliminal channel in the context of signature systems. [Des88b] presented a solution against subliminal channels and extended in [Des88a] the solution to abuse-free coin-flipping, abuse-free generation of public keys, and abuse-free zero-knowledge. In this paper we demonstrate that a whole family of systems (generalized Arthur-Merlin games) can be made abuse-free, avoiding the exhaustive approach of [Des88a]. We will hereto formalize the concept of abuse.

Keywords

Interactive Proof Random Tape Interactive Proof System Communication Tape Subliminal Channel 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yvo G. Desmedt
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. EE & CSUniv. of Wisconsin — MilwaukeeMilwaukeeUSA

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