This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
9. Selected References
D. Abreu and A. Sen, “Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium,” Econometrica V. 59, 1991, pp. 997–1021.
L. Hurwicz, E. Maskin and A. Postlewaite, “Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules when the Designer Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets,” in Ledyard, J. O. (ed.) The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, 1995.
M. Jackson, “A Crash Course in Implementation Theory,” Social Choice and Welfare V. 18, 2001, pp. 655–708.
E. Maskin, “Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,” Review of Economic Studies V. 66, 1999, pp. 23–38.
H. Matsushima, “A New Approach to the Implementation Problem,” Journal of Economic Theory V. 45, 1988, pp. 128–144.
J. Moore, “Implementation, Contracts and Renegotiation in Environments with Complete Information,” in J. J. Laffont (ed.) Advances in Economic Theory, VI World Congress of the Econometric Society (vol. I), Cambridge University Press, 1992.
R. Repullo, “A Simple Proof of Maskin Theorem on Nash Implementation,” Social Choice and Welfare V. 4, 1987, pp. 39–41.
R. Serrano, “The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules,” SIAM Review V. 46, 2004, pp. 377–414.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2006 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
(2006). Nash Implementation. In: Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd Edition. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-29368-X_16
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-29368-X_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-29367-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-387-29368-4
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)