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Corporations, collective action and corporate governance: One size does not fit all

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Policy Challenges and Political Responses

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Abstract

A review of the theory and evidence on corporate governance indicates several related themes. First, corporate governance is multidimensional. Second, corporate governance is an endogenous response to a firm’s economic environment. Third, the role of different governance mechanisms varies across industries. New analysis of a sample of 1235 US corporations from 40 different industries in the year 2000 confirms the empirical regularities reported in prior research. The central policy implication of the prior research and new supporting evidence is that one size does not fit all in corporate governance.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, CA, 91711, USA

    J. Harold Mulherin

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  1. J. Harold Mulherin
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, The University of Mississippi, Mississippi, MS, USA

    William F. Shughart II

  2. Department of Economics, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA

    Robert D. Tollison

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Mulherin, J.H. (2005). Corporations, collective action and corporate governance: One size does not fit all. In: Shughart, W.F., Tollison, R.D. (eds) Policy Challenges and Political Responses. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-28038-3_10

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