Keywords
- Optimal Contract
- Private Signal
- Hurdle Model
- Incentive Constraint
- Reservation Utility
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(2005). Pre-Contract Information — Uninformed Principal Moves First. In: Economics of Accounting. Springer Series in Accounting Scholarship, vol 2. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26599-6_8
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