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Multiple Tasks and Multiple Performance Measures

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References

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(2005). Multiple Tasks and Multiple Performance Measures. In: Economics of Accounting. Springer Series in Accounting Scholarship, vol 2. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26599-6_5

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