Keywords
- Productive Agent
- Optimal Contract
- External Auditor
- Internal Auditor
- Information Rent
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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(2005). Contracting with a Productive Agent and a Monitor. In: Economics of Accounting. Springer Series in Accounting Scholarship, vol 2. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26599-6_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26599-6_15
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