Keywords
- Nash Equilibrium
- Optimal Contract
- Hurdle Model
- General Partner
- Incentive Compatibility Constraint
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References
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(2005). Contracting with Multiple Productive Agents. In: Economics of Accounting. Springer Series in Accounting Scholarship, vol 2. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26599-6_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26599-6_14
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