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Inter-Period Contract Renegotiation

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Part of the Springer Series in Accounting Scholarship book series (KLAS,volume 2)

Keywords

  • Switching Cost
  • Certainty Equivalent
  • Optimal Contract
  • Incentive Rate
  • Initial Contract

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(2005). Inter-Period Contract Renegotiation. In: Economics of Accounting. Springer Series in Accounting Scholarship, vol 2. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26599-6_13

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