Keywords
- Risk Premium
- Certainty Equivalent
- Optimal Contract
- Effort Cost
- Incentive Rate
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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References
Christensen, P. O., G. A. Feltham, and F. Şabac. (2003) “Dynamic Incentives and Responsibility Accounting: A Comment,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 35, 423–436.
Christensen, P. O., G. A. Feltham, C. Hofmann, and F. Şabac. (2004) “Timeliness, Accuracy, and Relevance in Dynamic Incentive Contracts,” Working Paper, University of British Columbia.
Feltham, G. A., R. Indjejikian, and D. J. Nanda. (2005) “Dynamic Incentives and Dual Purpose Accounting,” Working Paper, University of Michigan.
Hirao, Y. (1993) “Learning and Incentive Problems in Repeated Partnerships,” International Economic Review 34, 101–119.
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(2005). Full Commitment Contracts with Interdependent Periods. In: Economics of Accounting. Springer Series in Accounting Scholarship, vol 2. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26599-6_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26599-6_12
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