Keywords
- Interest Rate
- Risk Aversion
- Wealth Effect
- Certainty Equivalent
- Optimal Contract
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(2005). Multi-Period Contracts with Full Commitment and Independent Periods. In: Economics of Accounting. Springer Series in Accounting Scholarship, vol 2. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26599-6_10
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