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Multidisciplinary Economics pp 167–186Cite as

Public Governance and Private Governance: Exchanging Ideas

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Switzerland

    B. S. Frey (research director)

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Utrecht School of Economics, The Netherlands and Osnabrück University, Germany

    Peter De Gijsel

  2. Utrecht School of Economics, The Netherlands

    Hans Schenk

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Frey, B.S. (2005). Public Governance and Private Governance: Exchanging Ideas. In: De Gijsel, P., Schenk, H. (eds) Multidisciplinary Economics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-26259-8_17

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