Abstract
This paper examines open source software development in a competitive environment. The quality of open source software improves over time based upon contributions by firms and users. A firm’s decision to contribute is interesting because it also augments competitors’ software quality in future periods subject to compatibility considerations with their existing software. A differential game model is developed to understand why firms are increasingly involved in open source software development by determining the optimal contributions and software quality over time. We obtain a closed-loop Nash equilibrium solution. Examples are given to derive insights from this model.
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Haruvy, E., Prasad, A., Sethi, S.P., Zhang, R. (2005). Optimal Firm Contributions to Open Source Software. In: Deissenberg, C., Hartl, R.F. (eds) Optimal Control and Dynamic Games. Advances in Computational Management Science, vol 7. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-25805-1_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-25805-1_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-0-387-25804-1
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