Modeling the impacts of Bargaining Power in the Multilateral Distribution of Agricultural Biodiversity Conservation Funds

Part of the Natural Resource Management and Policy book series (NRMP, volume 27)


The previous chapter addressed the question of what is the most economically efficient method of distributing the agricultural biodiversity conservation funds from the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture among countries and world regions. This chapter uses game theory to extend the analysis to take into account the possibilities for players, i.e., countries receiving the funds, to form coalitions with respect to obtaining the funds. The analysis applies the Shapley value concept of an n-person cooperative game to determining distribution of the funds at several levels of the negotiating process, e.g., at the country, world region, and fund administrator levels. Using this approach, the impacts of players’ bargaining power on the resulting allocations can be empirically assessed. Furthermore, the approach allows us to explicitly account for potentially competing interests of the players, thereby introducing some equity to the allocation.

Key words

agricultural production agriculture bargaining power biodiversity centers of diversity coalition structures equity game theory in situ conservation International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture plant genetic resources for food and agriculture Shapley value 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute National de la Recherche Agronomique, Economie et Sociologie RuralesRennes cedexFrance
  2. 2.Resource Economics Division, Economic Research Service (United States Department of Agriculture)Washington, DCUSA

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