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Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle

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  1. Mathew D. McCubbins
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Paris (Pantheon-Sorbonne), France

    Claude Menard

  2. The Ronald Coase Institute, Chevy Chase, MD, USA

    Mary M. Shirley

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McCubbins, M.D. (2005). Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle. In: Menard, C., Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-25092-1_7

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