Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Handbook of New Institutional Economics pp 465–490Cite as

Agricultural Contracts

  • Chapter

Keywords

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (Canada)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   259.00
Price excludes VAT (Canada)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   329.99
Price excludes VAT (Canada)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Ackerberg, Daniel and Maristella Botticini. 2002. “Endogenous Matching and the Empirical eterminants of Contract Form”. Journal of Political Economy 110.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alchian, Armen A. 1950. “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory”. Journal of Political J Economy 58: 211–221.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Allen, Douglas W. 2000. “Transaction Costs” in Bouckaert, Boudewijn, and DeGeest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol. 1. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Press, pp. 893–926.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, Douglas W. and Dean Lueck. 1992a. “Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent vs. Cropshare”. Journal of Law and Economics 35: 397–426.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, Douglas W. and Dean Lueck. 1992b. “The Back-Forty on a Handshake: Specific Assets, Reputation, and the Structure of Farmland Contracts”. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 8: 366–377.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, Douglas W. and Dean Lueck. 1993. “Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts”. RAND Journal of Economics 24: 78–100.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, Douglas W. and Dean Lueck. 1995. “Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts”. American Economic Review 85: 447–451.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, Douglas W. and Dean Lueck. 1998. “The Nature of the Farm”. Journal of Law and J Economics 41: 343–386.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Allen, Douglas W. and Dean Lueck. 1999a. “The Role of Risk in Contract Choice”. Journal J of Law, Economics, and Organization 15: 704–736.

    Google Scholar 

  • Allen, Douglas W. and Dean Lueck. 2002. The Nature of the Farm: Contracts, Risk, and Organization in Agriculture. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alston Lee J., Gary D. Libecap, and Bernardo Mueller. 2000. Title, Conflict and Land Use Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, Terry L. and Dean Lueck. 1992. “Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity on Indian Reservations”. Journal of Law and Economics 35: 427–454.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker, George P. and Thomas N. Hubbard. 2003. “Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design and Information”. American Economic Review, in press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bardhan, P. and Singh, N. 1987. “On Moral Hazard and Cost Sharing Under Sharecropping”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69: 382–383.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barzel, Yoram. 1997. Economic Analysis of Property Rights, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berry, Russell L. 1962. “Cost Sharing as a Means of Improving the Share Rent Lease”. Journal of Farm Economics 44: 796–807.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braverman, Avishay and Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1982. “Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets”. American Economic Review 72: 695–715.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braverman, Avishay and Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1986. “Cost-Sharing Arrangements Under Sharecropping: Moral Hazard, Incentive Flexibility, and Risk”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68: 642–652.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burkhart, Barry G. 1991. “Leases: Farmland Lease Provisions in Oklahoma”. Oklahoma Law Review 44: 461–491.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carmona, Juan and James Simpson. 1999. “'Rabassa Morta in Catalan Viticulture: The Rise and Decline of a Long-Term Sharecropping Contract, 1670s–1920s”. Journal of Economic J History 59: 290–315.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chiappori, Pierre Andre and Bernard Salanie. 2000. “Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work”. Invited Lecture, World Congress of the Econometric Society, Seattle.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cheung, Steven N. S. 1969. The Theory of Share Tenancy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, Ronald H. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost”. Journal of Law and Economics J 3: 1–41.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Crocker, Keith J. and Masten, Scott E. 1988. “Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length”. RAND Journal of Economics 19: 327–343.

    Google Scholar 

  • Deininger, Klaus and Gershon Feder. 2001. “Land Institution and Land Markets” in B.L. Gardner and G.C. Rausser, (eds.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 1B. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.

    Google Scholar 

  • Drache, Hiram. 1964. The Day of the Bonanza. Fargo: North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dubois, Pierre. 2002. “Moral Hazard, Land Fertility and Sharecropping in a Rural Area of the Phillipines”. Journal of Development Economics, 68: 35–64.

    Google Scholar 

  • DuBow, Shane. 1999. “Wheaties: Chasing the Ripening Harvest Across America's Great Plains”. Harper's Magazine August. 33–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edwards, William and V. Meyer. 1986. “Acquiring Farm Machinery Services: Ownership, Custom Hire, Rental, Lease”. Ames: Cooperative Extension Service of Iowa State University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edwards, William and Michael Boehle. 1980. “Machinery Selection Considering Timeliness Losses”. Transactions of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers 810–821.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellickson, Robert C. 1991. Order Without Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eswaran, M. and A. Kotwal. 1985. “A Theory of Contractual Structure in Agriculture”. American Economic Review 75: 352–367.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frank, S. D. and D. R. Henderson. 1992. “Transaction Cost as Determinants of Vertical Coordination in the U.S. Food Industries”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, November.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fulton, Murray. 1995. “The Future of Canadian Agriculture Cooperatives: A Property Rights Approach”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Galassi, Francesco. 1992. “Tuscans and Their Farms: The Economics of Share Tenancy in Fifteenth Century Florence”. Rivista di Storia Economica 9: 77–94.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garen, John E. 1994. “Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory”. Journal of Political Economy 102: 1175–1199.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Gaynor, Martin and Paul J. Gertler. 1995. “Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnership”. RAND Journal of Economics 26: 591–613.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gray, L.C., Charles Stewart, Howard Turner, J.T. Sanders, and W. J. Spillman, 1924. “Farm Ownership and Tenancy”. Yearbook of the Department of Agriculture, 1923. Washington: U.S. Printing Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hallagan, William. 1978. “Self-Selection by Contractual Choice and the Theory of Sharecropping”. Bell Journal of Economics 9: 344–354.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart, O.D. 1995. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayami, Yuruiro and Keijiro Otsuka. 1993. The Economics of Contract Choice: An Agrarian Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heady, E.O. 1947. “Economics of Farm Leasing Systems”. Journal of Farm Economics 29: 659–678.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoffman, Phillip T. 1984. “The Economic Theory of Sharecropping in Early Modern France”. Journal of Economic History 44: 309–319.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holmstrom, Bengt. and Paul Milgrom. 1991. “Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7: 24–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hopkin, J. 1971. “Leasing versus Buying of Machinery”. Journal of American Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers 17–23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Irwin, George D. and Lawrence N. Smith. 1972. “Machinery Leasing: Perspectives and Prospects”. Agricultural Finance Review 33: 42–47.

    Google Scholar 

  • Isern, Thomas D. 1981. Custom Combining on the Great Plains. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, D. Gale. 1950. “Resource Allocation Under Share Contracts”. Journal of Political Economy 58: 111–123.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Joskow, Paul L. 1987. “Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets”. American Economic Review 77: 168–185.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein, Benjamin, Crawford, Robert G. and Armen A. Alchian. 1978. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process”. Journal of Law and Economics 21: 297–326.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Klein, Benjamin and Keith B. Leffler. 1981. “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance”. Journal of Political Economy 89: 615–641.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kliebenstein, James B. and John D. Lawrence. 1995. “Contracting and Vertical Coordination in the United States Pork Industry”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77: 1213–1218.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knoeber, Charles R. 1989. “A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 5: 271–292.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knoeber, Charles R. 2000. “Land and Livestock Contracting in Agriculture: A Principal-Agent Perspective” in Vol. III, Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 1133–1153.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knoeber, Charles R. and Walter N. Thurman. 1994. “Testing the Theory of Tournaments: An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production”. Journal of Labor Economics 12: 155–179.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Lagrone, William F. and Earle E. Gavett. 1975. Interstate Custom Combining in the Great Plains in 1971. Economic Research Service Paper no. 563. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laffontaine, Francine. 1992. “Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results”. RAND Journal of Economics 26: 263–283.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lazzarini, S.G., F.R. Chaddad, and M.L. Cook. 2001. “Integrating Supply Chain and Network Analysis: The Study of Netchains”. Journal of Chain and Network Science 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lazear, Edward P. 1986. “Salaries and Piece Rates”. Journal of Business 59: 405–431.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Lazear, Edward P. 1995. Personnel Economics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leffler Keith and Randall Rucker. 1991. “Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts”. Journal of Political Economy 99: 1060–1087.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Luporini, Annalisa, and Bruno Parigi. 1996. “Multi-Task Sharecropping Contracts: The Italian Mezzadria”. Economica 63: 445–457.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lyon, Thomas P. and Steven C. Hackett. 1993. “Bottlenecks and Governance Structures: Open-Access and Long-Term Contracting in Natural Gas”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 9: 380–398.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macauley, Stewart. 1963. “Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study”. American Sociological Review 28: 55–67.

    Google Scholar 

  • Masten, Scott E. and Stephane Saussier. 2000. “Econometrics of Contracts: An Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting”. Revue-d'Economie Industrielle 92: (2nd–3rd Trimesters) 215–236.

    Google Scholar 

  • Masten, Scott E., James Meehan, and Edward Snyder. 1991. “The Costs of Organization”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7: 1–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, Robert. 1988. “Risk Sharing and Franchising”. American Economic Review 78: 954–968.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martinez, S.W. and Reed. 1996. “From Farmers to Consumers: Vertical Coordination in the Food Industry”. USDA Report 720.

    Google Scholar 

  • Menard, Claude. 1996. “On Clusters, Hybrids, and other Strange Forms: The Case of the French Poultry Industry”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 152: 154–183.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mill, John S. [1871] 1965. Principles of Political Economy Ashley (ed.). New York: Kelley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Newberry, David and Joseph Stiglitz. 1979. “Sharecropping, risk-sharing, and the Importance of Imperfect Information” in James Roumasset, Jean-Marc Boussard, and Inderjit Singh (eds.), Risk, Uncertainty and Agricultural Development. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nickerson, Jack A. and Brian S. Silverman. 2002. “Why Aren't All Truck Drivers Owner-Operators?” Journal of Economics, Management and Strategy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry, Janet, Mitch Morehart, David Banker, and Jim Johnson. 1997. “Contracting: A Business Option for Many Farmers” 1997. Agricultural Outlook May: 2–5.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pflueger, Burton W. 1994. “Farm Machinery Costs: Own, Lease, or Custom Hire”. Cooperative Extension Service of South Dakota State University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prendergast, Canice. 1999. “The Provision of Incentives in Firms”. Journal of Economic Literature 37: 7–63.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prendergast, Canice. 2000. “What Trade-Off of Risk and Incentives?” American Economic Review 90: 421–425.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prendergast, Canice. 2002. “The Tenuous Trade-Off Between Risk and Incentives”. Journal of Political Economy 110: 1071–1102.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Rao, C.H. Hanamutha. 1971. “Uncertainty, Entrepreneurship, and Sharecropping in India”. Journal of Political Economy 79: 578–595.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Roy, Ewell Paul. 1963. Contract Farming, U.S.A. Danville, IL: Interstate Printers and Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salanie, Bernard. 1997. The Economics of Contracts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sappington, David E.M. 1991. “Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 45–66.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sauvee, L. “Efficiency, Effectiveness and the Design of Network Governance” 5th Conference on Chain Management in Agribusiness and the Food Industry, The Netherlands.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shelanski, Howard A. and Peter G. Klein. 1995. “Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11: 335–361.

    Google Scholar 

  • Short, Cameron and Kangethe W. Gitu. 1991. “Timeliness Costs for Machinery Selection”. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 39: 457–462.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, Adam. [1776] 1992. The Wealth of Nations, Kathryn Sutherland. (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sotomayer, Narda L., Paul N. Ellinger, and Peter J. Barry. 2000. “Choice Among Leasing Contracts in Farm Real Estate”. Agricultural Finance Review 60: 71–84.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stiglitz, Joseph. 1974. “Incentives and Risk-Sharing in Sharecropping”. Review of Economic Studies 41: 219–255.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tsoodle, Leah J. and Christine A. Wilson. 2000. “Nonirrigated Crop-Share Leasing Arrangements in Kansas” Staff Paper No. 01-02 Kansas State University Department of Agricultural Economics (Manhattan, KS).

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, Charles M. 1953. “Enterprise on the Prairies”. Harvard Business Review 31: 97–102.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, Oliver. E. 1979. “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations”. Journal of Law and Economics 22: 233–261.

    CrossRef  Google Scholar 

  • Young, H. Peyton and Mary A. Burke. 2001. “Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture”. American Economic Review 559–573.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Douglas W. Allen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Dean Lueck
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Paris (Pantheon-Sorbonne), France

    Claude Menard

  2. The Ronald Coase Institute, Chevy Chase, MD, USA

    Mary M. Shirley

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Allen, D.W., Lueck, D. (2005). Agricultural Contracts. In: Menard, C., Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-25092-1_19

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

search

Navigation