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Legal Institutions and Financial Development

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Authors
  1. Thorsten Beck
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Paris (Pantheon-Sorbonne), France

    Claude Menard

  2. The Ronald Coase Institute, Chevy Chase, MD, USA

    Mary M. Shirley

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Beck, T., Levine, R. (2005). Legal Institutions and Financial Development. In: Menard, C., Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-25092-1_12

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