Abstract
This note considers production (or market) games with transferable utility. It brings out that, in many cases, explicit core solutions may be defined by shadow prices — and reached via quite natural dynamics.
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Flåm, S.D. (2005). Production Games and Price Dynamics. In: Haurie, A., Zaccour, G. (eds) Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24602-9_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24602-9_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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