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Developing Agents Who Can Realte to Us

Putting Agents in Our Loop via Situated Self-Creation
  • Bruce Edmonds
Part of the Multiagent Systems, Artificial Societies, and Simulated Organizations book series (MASA, volume 3)

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of how to produce artificial agents so that they can relate to us. To achieve this it is argued that the agent must have humans in its developmental loop and not merely as designers. The suggestion is that an agent needs to construct its self as humans do — by adopting at a fundamental level others as its model for its self as well as vice versa. The beginnings of an architecture to achieve this is sketched. Some of the consequences of adopting such an approach to producing agents is discussed.

Keywords

Intelligent Agent Basic Decision Social Embeddedness Foundational Issue Evolutionary Computation Technique 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bruce Edmonds
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre for Policy ModellingManchester Metropolitan UniversityManchesterUK

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