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Security Modelling for Electronic Commerce: The Common Electronic Purse Specifications

  • Jan Jürjens
  • Guido Wimmel
Part of the IFIP International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 74)

Abstract

Designing security-critical systems correctly is very difflcult. We present work on software engineering of security critical systems, supported by the CASE tool AUTOFOCUS.

Security critical systems are specified with extended structure diagrams, message sequence charts for the protocols and statecharts for the attacker, translated into an AUTOFOCUS system model and examined for security weaknesses using model checking. Additionally, the specifications could be simulated or tested - which is a first step towards integration of cryptographic primitives, intuitive graphical modelling, simulation and model checking.

We explain our method at the example of a part of the Common Electronic Purse Specifications (CEPS), and comment on potential of vulnerability and consequences for the design.

Keywords

Model Check Smart Card Security Protocol Security Modelling Cryptographic Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jan Jürjens
    • 1
  • Guido Wimmel
    • 2
  1. 1.Computing LaboratoryUniversity of OxfordUK
  2. 2.Dept. of Computer ScienceMunich University of TechnologyGermany

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