Abstract
In this paper we develop algorithms for efficiently processing bids in a single item, N unit (N ≥1) open cry auction for a large class of winner determination rules. Existing techniques consider all previously submitted bids along with the new arrivals to update the current set of winners. We propose that at most N “potential winner bids” amongst the previously submitted bids need to be used for such updates, thus significantly reducing the computation time and memory requirements. This is crucial when a large number of auctions are being conducted simultaneously. For a commonly used greedy auction rule we show that the expected number of potential winner bids may be much less than N under reasonable probabilistic assumptions.
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© 2001 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing
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Bassamboo, A., Gupta, M., Juneja, S. (2001). Efficient Winner Determination Techniques for Internet Multi-Unit Auctions. In: Schmid, B., Stanoevska-Slabeva, K., Tschammer, V. (eds) Towards the E-Society. IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, vol 74. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47009-8_30
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47009-8_30
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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