Software-based Receipt-freeness in On-line Elections
Electronic elections could be a viable alternative for real-life elections in a democratic society. In traditional elections, a voting booth does more than allow voters to keep their vote secret. The voting booth actually requires that voters vote secretly. If the privacy of the vote was allowed but not required, then a voter could easily sell his vote to a vote-buyer, or be coerced by a coercer. We present a receipt-free election scheme without making any hardware or physical assumptions about the communication channel between the voter and the voting authorities. Our solution is software-based i.e. voters are able to exercise their electoral rights from their home by using a personal computer with Internet access. The only physical assumption we make use of is an untappable channel between the two voting authorities that are employed in our scheme. This scheme satisfies most requirements of a secure electronic election. We make use of well-known cryptographic techniques such as time-lock puzzles and blind signatures.
KeywordsReceipt-freeness electronic voting privacy
- D. Alpert, D. Ellard, O. Kavazovic, M. Scheff. Receipt-Free Secure Elections 6.857 Final Project, 6.857 Network and Computer Security, 1998, http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~ellard/6.857/final.ps.
- J. Benaloh, D. Tuinstra. Receipt-free secret-ballot elections, 26th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, Proceedings, 1994, pp. 544–553.Google Scholar
- D. Chaum. Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments, Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 82, Proceedings, Plenum Press 1982, pp. 199–203.Google Scholar
- L. Cottrell. Mixmaster and Remailer Attacks, http://obscura.obscura.com/~loki/remailer/remailer-essay.html.
- L. Cranor, R. Cytron. Sensus: A security-conscious electronic polling system for the Internet, Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Proceedings, 1997, http://www.research.att.com/~lorrie/pubs/hicss/hicss.html.
- M. Franklin, M. Reiter. Fair exchange with a semi-trusted third party, 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Proceedings, ACM 1997, pp. 1–6.Google Scholar
- B. Lee, K. Kim. Receipt-free Electronic Voting through Collaboration of Voter and Honest Verifier, JWISC 2000, Proceedings, 2000, pp. 101–108.Google Scholar
- Y. Mu, V. Varadharajan. Anonymous Secure e-voting over a network, 14th Annual Computer Security Application Conference, Proceedings, IEEE Computer Society 1998, pp. 293–299.Google Scholar
- T. Okamoto. An Electronic Voting Scheme, IFIP’ 96, Proceedings, Advanced IT Tools, Chapman & Hall 1996, pp. 21–30.Google Scholar
- A. Riera, J. Borrell, J. Rifa. An uncoercibleverifiable electronic voting protocol, 14th International Information Security Conference IFIP/SEC’98, Proceedings, 1998, pp. 206–215.Google Scholar
- R. Rivest, A. Shamir, D. Wagner. Time-Lock Puzzles and Timed-Released Crypto, LCS Technical Memo MIT/LCS/TR-684, 1996, http://www.theory.Ics.rnit.edu/~rivest/RivestShamirWagner-timelock.ps
- K. Sako. Electronic Voting Scheme Allowing Open Objection to the Tally, IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, Proceedings, Vol. E77-A(1), 1994, pp. 24–30.Google Scholar
- B. Schneier. Applied Cryptography-Protocols, Algorithms and Source Code in C, 2nd Edition, 1996.Google Scholar