Software-based Receipt-freeness in On-line Elections

  • Emmanouil Magkos
  • Vassilios Chrissikopoulos
  • Nikos Alexandris
Part of the IFIP International Federation for Information Processing book series (IFIPAICT, volume 78)

Abstract

Electronic elections could be a viable alternative for real-life elections in a democratic society. In traditional elections, a voting booth does more than allow voters to keep their vote secret. The voting booth actually requires that voters vote secretly. If the privacy of the vote was allowed but not required, then a voter could easily sell his vote to a vote-buyer, or be coerced by a coercer. We present a receipt-free election scheme without making any hardware or physical assumptions about the communication channel between the voter and the voting authorities. Our solution is software-based i.e. voters are able to exercise their electoral rights from their home by using a personal computer with Internet access. The only physical assumption we make use of is an untappable channel between the two voting authorities that are employed in our scheme. This scheme satisfies most requirements of a secure electronic election. We make use of well-known cryptographic techniques such as time-lock puzzles and blind signatures.

Keywords

Receipt-freeness electronic voting privacy 

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Emmanouil Magkos
    • 1
  • Vassilios Chrissikopoulos
    • 2
  • Nikos Alexandris
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of InformaticsUniversity of PiraeusPiraeusGreece
  2. 2.Department of Archiving and Libmry StudiesIonian UniversityCorfuGreece

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