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Endnotes and References
Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).
Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” Harvard Law Review (1897), 10: 61–80.
Holmes note 2, p. 63.
Holmes note 2, p. 62.
Posner note 1, p. ix.
This point is made by Ronald Dworkin in “Darwin’s New Bulldog,” Harvard Law Review (1998), 111:1718–1738.
Roger B. Dworkin, Limits — The Role ofLaw in Bioethical Decision Making (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996).
Examples include Eric J. Cassell, “Moral Thought in Clinical Practice: Applying the Abstract to the Usual,” in H. Tristram Engelhardt and Daniel Callahan, eds., Science, Ethics and Medicine (New York: Hastings on Hudson, 1976); Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
Robert M. Veatch, The Patient — Physician Relations: The Patient As Partner (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991).
Robert M. Veatch, The Patient-Physician Relations: The Patient As Partner (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991).
George J. Annas, “The Dominance of American Law (and Market Values) over American Bioethics,” in M. A. Grodin, ed., Meta Medical Ethics: The Philosophical Foundations of Bioethics (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), p. 83.
Alexander Morgan Capron, “Law and Bioethics,” in Warren T. Reich, ed., Encyclopedia of Bioethics, (N.Y.: Simon & Schuster MacMillan, 1995), pp. 1329–1334.
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
Annas note 11, p. 84.
Ronald Dworkin, “Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief,” The New York Review of Books, March 27, 1997, p. 41.
George J. Annas, Leonard H. Glantz, Wendy K. Mariner, Brief for Bioethics Professors, November 12, 1996.
“Bioethicists’ Statement on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Cruzan Decision,” New England Journal of Medicine (1990), 323: 686.
“Dying Well In The Hospital: The Lessons of SUPPORT,” Special Supplement, Hastings Center Report (1995), 25: S1–S36.
John C. Fletcher, “Bioethics in a Legal Forum: Confessions of an ‘Expert’ Witness,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1997), 22: 297–324.
Fletcher note 19, p. 316.
Fletcher, note 19, p. 318.
This point is also made by Virginia A. Sharpe and Edmund D. Pellegrino in “Medical Ethics in the Courtroom: A Reappraisal,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1997), pp. 373–379.
Richard Delgado and P. G. McAllen, “The Moralist as an Expert Witness,” Boston University Law Review (1982), pp. 869–926.
Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).
Giles R. Scofield, “Ethics Consultation: The Least Dangerous Profession“,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (1993), pp. 417–426.
Federal Rules of Evidence §702 (1975).
See, e.g., Giles Scofield, “Commentary: The Wizard of Oughts,” The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (2000), 28: 232–235.
An excellent articulation of this view in the context of an analysis of expert testimony by bioethicists can be found in George J. Agich and Bethany J. Spielman, “Ethics Expert Testimony: Against the Skeptics,” Journalof Medicineand Philosophy (1997), 22: 381–403.
Sherwin Nuland, How We Die, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), pp. 250–254.
It is interesting to note that bioethics has been subjected to diametrically opposite critiques, as the following passage indicates: Among the most prominent criticisms of bioethics are that it is not serious, well-grounded scholarship; it has no well-defined and clear methodology; it lacks any solid conceptual foundation but is based instead on the shifting sands of moral sentiment; it is too abstractly removed from realities of clinical practice to merit being taken seriously; it is unteachable; it pursues unanswerable questions; its utility has not been demonstrated; it makes practical matters worse by confusing health care providers, policy-makers, and researchers; and it is itself ethically problematic, because it either implicitly endorses traditional values that ought to be challenged or undermines traditional values that ought to be advocated and reinforced. Samuel Gorovitz, “Bioethics,” in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker, eds., Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992).
For additional examples see Hugo Adam Bedau, “Applied Ethics,” in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker, eds., Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992).
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(2002). The New Synergy — Bioethics in Court. In: Strange Bedfellows. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-46849-2_9
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