Relations among notions of security for public-key encryption schemes

  • Mihir Bellare
  • Anand Desai
  • David Pointcheval
  • Phillip Rogaway
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/BFb0055718

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1462)
Cite this paper as:
Bellare M., Desai A., Pointcheval D., Rogaway P. (1998) Relations among notions of security for public-key encryption schemes. In: Krawczyk H. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '98. CRYPTO 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1462. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of privacy and non-malleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove either an implication (every scheme meeting one notion must meet the other) or a separation (there is a scheme meeting one notion but not the other, assuming the first notion can be met at all). We similarly treat plaintext awareness, a notion of security in the random oracle model. An additional contribution of this paper is a new definition of non-malleability which we believe is simpler than the previous one.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mihir Bellare
    • 1
  • Anand Desai
    • 1
  • David Pointcheval
    • 2
    • 3
  • Phillip Rogaway
    • 4
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer Science & EngineeringUniversity of California at San DiegoLa JollaUSA
  2. 2.Laboratoire d'Informatique de l'École Normale SupérieureParisFrance
  3. 3.GREYC, Dépt d'InformatiqueUniversité de CaenCaen CedexFrance
  4. 4.Dept. of Computer Science, Engineering II Bldg.University of California at DavisDavisUSA

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