Can we eliminate certificate revocation lists?

  • Ronald L. Rivest
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1465)

Abstract

We briefly consider certificate revocation lists (CRLs), and ask whether they could, and should, be eliminated, in favor of other mechanisms. In most cases, the answer seems to be “yes.” We suggest some possible replacement mechanisms.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ronald L. Rivest
    • 1
  1. 1.MIT Laboratory for Computer ScienceCambridge

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