A practical mix

  • Markus Jakobsson
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1403)

Abstract

We introduce a robust and efficient mix-network for exponentiation, and use it to obtain a threshold decryption mix-network for ElGamal encrypted messages, in which mix servers do not need to trust each other for the correctness of the result. If a subset of mix servers cheat, they will be caught with an overwhelming probability, and the decryption can restart after replacing them, in a fashion that is transparent to the participants providing the input to be decrypted. As long as a quorum is not controlled by an adversary, the privacy of the mix is guaranteed. Our solution is proved to be secure if a commonly used assumption, the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption, holds.

Of possible independent interest are two new methods that we introduce: blinded destructive robustness, a type of destructive robustness with protection against leaks of secret information; and repetition robustness, a method for obtaining robustness for some distributed vector computations. Here, two or more calculations of the same equation are performed, where the different computations are made independent by the use of blinding and permutation. The resulting vectors are then unblinded, sorted and compared to each other. This allows us to detect cheating (resulting in inequality of the vectors).

Also of possible independent interest is a modular extension to the El-Gamal encryption scheme, making the resulting scheme non-malleable in the random oracle model. This is done by interpreting part of the ciphertext as a public key, and sign the ciphertext using the corresponding secret key.

Keywords

mix-network decryption privacy robustness error detection 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Markus Jakobsson
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Sciences Research CenterBell LabsMurray Hill

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