An authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol secure against active attacks
A two-party authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is proposed. The protocol is practical and provably secure against passive eavesdropping, impersonation, interference, active eavesdropping and pretense in the random oracle model on the assumptions that the Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable and that the secret pieces of information of users are selected at random and independently of each other. All of these attacks are assumed to be known-key attacks. The security against passive eavesdropping is proved on the assumption that the attacker knows the secret pieces of information of the participants. As an application of the proposed protocol, a star-based conference key distribution protocol is also designed.
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