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An authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol secure against active attacks

  • Shouichi Hirose
  • Susumu Yoshida
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1431)

Abstract

A two-party authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is proposed. The protocol is practical and provably secure against passive eavesdropping, impersonation, interference, active eavesdropping and pretense in the random oracle model on the assumptions that the Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable and that the secret pieces of information of users are selected at random and independently of each other. All of these attacks are assumed to be known-key attacks. The security against passive eavesdropping is proved on the assumption that the attacker knows the secret pieces of information of the participants. As an application of the proposed protocol, a star-based conference key distribution protocol is also designed.

Keywords

Discrete Logarithm Discrete Logarithm Problem Random Oracle Model Attack Phase Passive Eavesdrop 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shouichi Hirose
    • 1
  • Susumu Yoshida
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Electronics and Communication, Graduate School of EngineeringKyoto UniversityKyotoJapan

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