All-or-nothing encryption and the package transform

  • Ronald L. Rivest
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1267)

Abstract

We present a new mode of encryption for block ciphers, which we call all-or-nothing encryption. This mode has the interesting defining property that one must decrypt the entire ciphertext before one can determine even one message block. This means that brute-force searches against all-or-nothing encryption are slowed down by a factor equal to the number of blocks in the ciphertext. We give a specific way of implementing all-or-nothing encryption using a “package transform≓ as a pre-processing step to an ordinary encryption mode. A package transform followed by ordinary codebook encryption also has the interesting property that it is very efficiently implemented in parallel. All-or-nothing encryption can also provide protection against chosen-plaintext and related-message attacks.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ronald L. Rivest
    • 1
  1. 1.MIT Laboratory for Computer ScienceCambridge

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