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On applying linear cryptanalysis to IDEA

  • Philip Hawkes
  • Luke O'Connor
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1163)

Abstract

Linear cryptanalysis is a well-known attack based on linear approximations, and is said to be feasible for an n-bit block cipher if the data complexity is at most 2n. In this paper we consider IDEA with independent and uniformly distributed subkeys, referred to as IDEA with extended subkeys. We prove that any linear approximation of IDEA with extended subkeys, generalized to R rounds, requires at least R+[R/3] approximations to the multiply operation. We argue that the best approximations are based on approximating least significant bits in the round operations and show that the probability of selecting a key for which such a linear cryptanalysis is feasible on IDEA is approximately 2−100.

Keywords

Linear Approximation Linear Association Round Function Output Transformation Linear Cryptanalysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Philip Hawkes
    • 1
  • Luke O'Connor
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of MathematicsUniversity of QueenslandBrisbaneAustralia
  2. 2.Distributed Systems Technology Centre (DSTC)BrisbaneAustralia

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