A proposed architecture for trusted third party services

  • Nigel Jefferies
  • Chris Mitchell
  • Michael Walker
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1029)


In this paper we propose a novel solution to the problem of providing trusted third party services, such as the management of cryptographic keys for end-to-end encryption, in a way that meets legal requirements for warranted interception. Also included is a discussion of what might be a reasonable set of requirements for international provision of such services, as well as some analysis of the cryptographic properties of the architecture and how it might operate in practice.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nigel Jefferies
    • 1
  • Chris Mitchell
    • 1
  • Michael Walker
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security Group Royal HollowayUniversity of LondonEghamEngland

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