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A type-based approach to program security

  • Dennis Volpano
  • Geoffrey Smith
III FASE FASE-3: Types and Their Applications
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1214)

Abstract

This paper presents a type system which guarantees that well-typed programs in a procedural programming language satisfy a noninterference security property. With all program inputs and outputs classified at various security levels, the property basically states that a program output, classified at some level, can never change as a result of modifying only inputs classified at higher levels. Intuitively, this means the program does not “leak” sensitive data. The property is similar to a notion introduced years ago by Goguen and Meseguer to model security in multi-level computer systems [7]. We also give an algorithm for inferring and simplifying principal types, which document the security requirements of programs.

Keywords

Type System Type Variable Security Level Type Scheme Typing Rule 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dennis Volpano
    • 1
  • Geoffrey Smith
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceNaval Postgraduate SchoolMontereyUSA
  2. 2.School of Computer ScienceFlorida International UniversityMiamiUSA

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