RSA-type signatures in the presence of transient faults

  • Marc Joye
  • Jean-Jacques Quisquater
  • Feng Bao
  • Robert H. Deng
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1355)

Abstract

In this paper, we show that the presence of transient faults can leak some secret information. We prove that only one faulty RSA-signature is needed to recover one bit of the secret key. Thereafter, we extend this result to Lucas-based and elliptic curve systems.

Keywords

RSA Lucas sequences elliptic curves transient faults 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marc Joye
    • 1
  • Jean-Jacques Quisquater
    • 2
  • Feng Bao
    • 3
  • Robert H. Deng
    • 3
  1. 1.UCL Crypto Group, Dept of MathematicsUniversity of LouvainLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium
  2. 2.UCL Crypto Group, Microelectronics LabsUniversity of LouvainLouvain-la-NeuveBelgium
  3. 3.Institute of Systems ScienceNational University of Singapore Kent RidgeSingapore

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