China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and Indonesia

  • Siwage Dharma NegaraEmail author
  • Leo Suryadinata
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Asia-Pacific Political Economy book series (PASTAPPE)


This chapter investigates how Indonesia’s maritime initiative, the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) may or may not fit into China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI). It reveals that despite warm rhetoric, apparent complementarities between Indonesia’s GMF and China’s MSRI and the two countries’ economies, and some political reasons for cooperation, Indonesian participation in the scheme is limited. Reasons include the vagueness of the MSRI, the newness of the GMF, and the fact that the goals of the MSRI and GMF are not as synchronized as some believe. A study of the Jakarta–Bandung High-Speed Railway reveals how complicated it can be to bring a joint project online and to fruition. More broadly, the chapter demonstrates the necessity of considering international and domestic variables to analyze the MSRI.



The authors would like to thank the editor for his feedback and editorial suggestions and Xu Jing for her help conforming this chapter to publisher style requirements. In this chapter, all figures, unless otherwise noted, are given in United States dollars (USD).


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ISEAS-Yusof Ishak InstituteHeng Mui Keng TerraceSingapore

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