Abstract
The movement of immigrants is simulated by using a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) with move option. We explore the effect of collective behavior in an evolutionary migrating dynamics. Simulation results show that immigrants adopting collective strategy perform better and thus gain higher survival rate than those not. This research suggests that the clustering of immigrants promotes cooperation.
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5 Appendix
5 Appendix
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Always Defect (AllD) Defect on every move.
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Always Cooperate (AllC) Cooperate on every move.
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Collective Strategy (CS) Cooperate with kin members and defect against non-kin members.
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Always Cooperate with Move (AllCM) Cooperate on every move. If there exist kin members in neighborhood, then stay, else randomly move to one of eight neighboring empty places.
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Always Defect with Move (AllDM) Defect on every move. If there exist kin members in neighborhood, then stay, else randomly move to one of eight neighboring empty places.
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Collective Strategy with Move (CSM) Cooperate with kin members and defect against non-kin members. If there exist kin members in neighborhood, then stay, else randomly move to one of eight neighboring empty places.
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Collective Strategy with Move (CSM2) Cooperate with kin members and defect against non-kin members. If there exist more than 1 kin members in neighborhood, then stay, else randomly move to one of eight neighboring empty places.
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Collective Strategy with Move (CSM3) Cooperate with kin members and defect against non-kin members. If there exist more than 2 kin members in neighborhood, then stay, else randomly move to one of eight neighboring empty places.
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Collective Strategy with Move (CSM4) Cooperate with kin members and defect against non-kin members. If there exist more than 3 kin members in neighborhood, then stay, else randomly move to one of eight neighboring empty places.
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Lin, B. et al. (2020). Simulating Collective Behavior in the Movement of Immigrants by Using a Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma with Move Option. In: Pan, L., Liang, J., Qu, B. (eds) Bio-inspired Computing: Theories and Applications. BIC-TA 2019. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1160. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3415-7_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3415-7_9
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