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Comparative Analysis of Politician-Bureaucratic Governance Structure and Citizens’ Preference

  • Moriki HosoeEmail author
  • Masayuki Kanazaki
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Abstract

In this paper, we consider the allocation of authority of policy making between politicians and bureaucrats and analyze the efficiency of the political governances in several political-administrative institutions. In general, politicians pick up the subjects of policy and carry out the policy after the examination of these subjects with bureaucrats. Namely, they clarify the contents of these subjects, consider the basic line of the policy, adjust some stakes, and enact the policy.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Emeritus ProfessorKyushu UniversityFukuoka cityJapan
  2. 2.Faculty of EconomicsKyushu Sangyo UniversityFukuoka-ShiJapan

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