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Dizar: An Architecture of Distributed Public Key Infrastructure Based on Permissoned Blockchain

  • Qianyi DaiEmail author
  • Kaiyong Xu
  • Leyu Dai
  • Song Guo
Conference paper
  • 7 Downloads
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 1176)

Abstract

With the current blockchain-based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) being in its early stage of R&D, it is suffering from many shortcomings, such as its reliance on the centralized Certificate Authority (CA), the faulty identity registration and verification mechanism, and the difficulty in certificate management. As a result, the existing blockchain based PKI has trouble in adapting to a distributed network. Therefore, we have proposed Dizar: A distributed PKI architecture based on permissoned blockchain. Dizar architecture is designed with a distributed ledger operation system that can verify security. Based on no certificate authentication, electronic certificates with legal identities in the network are registered in a secure and verifiable permissioned blockchain, thus realizing the full-cycle management of the issued electronic certificates. The performance of Dizar is analyzed and compared with previous protocols. The results show that the Dizar architecture has better adaptability to a distributed network.

Keywords

Distributed PKI Permissioned blockchain Distributed ledger No-certificate authentication 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Zhengzhou Information Science and Technology InstituteZhengzhouChina

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