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Influence in Different Network Structures

  • Yunqi XueEmail author
  • Rohit Parikh
  • Mihai Gociu
Conference paper
  • 8 Downloads
Part of the Logic in Asia: Studia Logica Library book series (LIAA)

Abstract

We are interested in revisable and actionable social knowledge/belief that leads to a large group action. Instead of centralized coordination, bottom-up approach is our focus. We explore multiple methods of belief revision in social networks. Such belief revision in groups represents social influence and power to some degree. Both influences from friends and from experts are explained. We define an intuitive concept of expected influence of a group. When different influence sources are suggesting conflicting actions, agents could make strategic decisions by analyzing expected influence of different subgroups. We then show some properties of expected influence in different network structures. We also simulate the strategic influence emerging in small-world networks which represents many real-world networks.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate Center, CUNYNew York CityUSA
  2. 2.SpyhceCluj-NapocaRomania

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