A Case Study in India: Market as a Safety Net

  • Satoru Kimura
  • Yasuhide Nakamura
Part of the Trust book series (TRUST, volume 5)


In India, healthcare services are provided as a rule free of charge, and medicines are made available at low prices via the public dispensary system. The pharmaceutical industry of India is divided into a group of large-scale companies and a cluster of minute companies. These large-scale companies manufacture high-quality generic medicines for export to developed countries. On the other hand, India is internationally purported to be a supply source of counterfeit medicines.In contrast, the minute pharmaceutical companies primarily supply their products to public dispensaries through the government procurement system. Pricing is given priority in negotiation for a bid for government procurement, and in addition, bribes may be demanded by government officials during the negotiation, and this diminishes the motivation for the minute companies to improve the quality of their products. In this chapter, the authors discuss this duality on the basis of the results of our interview survey performed on distributors of drug products and community pharmacies in urban and peri-urban areas of Delhi City.


Bribery Dispensary Generic medicines India SSI 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Satoru Kimura
    • 1
  • Yasuhide Nakamura
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Reference StandardsPharmaceutical and Device Regulatory Science Society of JapanOsakaJapan
  2. 2.School of Nursing and RehabilitationKonan Women’s UniversityKobeJapan

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