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Nash Game Theory Leasing Contract Model of New and Recondition Complex Equipment

  • Mochamad Azka Harish
  • Andi CakravastiaEmail author
  • Bermawi P. Iskandar
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Mechanical Engineering book series (LNME)

Abstract

Complex condition of equipment maintenance lead many companies today considers outsourcing maintenance activities either to original equipment (OEM) or third-party maintenance company (agent). Objective of this research is to simultaneously consider two maintenance policies from perspectives of equipment lessor and lessee. The lessor offers two choices of equipment: (i) new equipment and (ii) reconditioned equipment. Lessee is going to compare these two options to maximize total profit. Nash game theory is applied to derive decision from both perspectives.

Keywords

Maintenance Complex equipment Outsource Game theory 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mochamad Azka Harish
    • 1
  • Andi Cakravastia
    • 1
    Email author
  • Bermawi P. Iskandar
    • 1
  1. 1.Industrial Engineering and Management Post Graduate Program, Faculty of Industrial TechnologyBandung Institute of TechnologyBandungIndonesia

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