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Law and Economics—Five Core Principles in the Cloud

  • Marcelo Corrales CompagnucciEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Perspectives in Law, Business and Innovation book series (PLBI)

Abstract

By its very nature, the study of cloud computing transformations is an interdisciplinary endeavor, drawing on complex technical and legal issues that include a variety of other social disciplines. Consequently, structuring a coherent theoretical framework requires careful scrutiny that goes beyond the capacity of any single discipline. Therefore, in order to gain a holistic understanding of these complex issues and to resolve adequately some of these problems, this chapter focuses on the contributions and synergies across the disciplines of law and economics.

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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Advanced Studies in Biomedical Innovation Law (CeBIL)University of CopenhagenCopenhagenDenmark

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