Local False Data Injection Attacks with Incomplete Network Information

  • Yijia Cao
  • Yong LiEmail author
  • Xuan Liu
  • Christian Rehtanz


Modern power system is not just a purely independent physical infrastructure incorporating generators, transmission lines, and other electrical units. It is also faced with a growing number of cyber-attacks due to its high dependence on advanced communication system and more open operational environment. When modern power system is attacked by a hacker, it will cause a huge harm to the entire system such as out service of communication system and the mask of overloading lines and generators, and the whole power system could become instable in some extreme cases. A typical example of cyber-attack in power systems is the famous collapse of the Ukraine power system due to cyber-attack. Therefore, it is of vital importance to investigate the cyber-attack on power systems and how to defense smart grid against cyber-attack. Cyber-attack can be mainly divided into the following two types: false data injection attacks and jamming attacks.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yijia Cao
    • 1
  • Yong Li
    • 2
    Email author
  • Xuan Liu
    • 3
  • Christian Rehtanz
    • 4
  1. 1.College of Electrical and Information EngineeringHunan UniversityChangshaChina
  2. 2.College of Electrical and Information EngineeringHunan UniversityChangshaChina
  3. 3.College of Electrical and Information EngineeringHunan UniversityChangshaChina
  4. 4.LS Energiesysteme und EnergiewirtschaftTU Dortmund UniversityDortmundGermany

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