Domain Conditions and Social Rationality pp 159-187 | Cite as

# Quasi-transitive Individual Preferences

## Abstract

This chapter is concerned with the class of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules and some of its subclasses when individual weak preference relations are reflexive, connected and quasi-transitive rather than orderings. Given that the domain consists of all logically possible profiles of individual reflexive, connected and quasi-transitive weak preference relations, a characterization is provided for the class of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules. Given that individual weak preference relations are reflexive, connected and quasi-transitive, conditions for quasi-transitivity are derived for the method of majority decision, the class of special majority rules, and the class of social decision rules which are simple games.

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