Advertisement

Neutral and Monotonic Binary Social Decision Rules

  • Satish Kumar JainEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter is concerned with the class of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules. The chapter provides a characterization for an important subclass of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules; and derives maximally sufficient conditions for transitivity for the class of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules and for its subclass of rules satisfying the Pareto-criterion.

References

  1. Blau, J.H. 1976. Neutrality, monotonicity and the right of veto: A comment. Econometrica 44: 603.MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Guha, A.S. 1972. Neutrality, monotonicity and the right of veto. Econometrica 40: 821–826.MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Jain, Satish K. 1977. Characterization of rationality conditions in terms of minimal decisive sets. Discussion Paper No. 7715. Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi.Google Scholar
  4. Jain, Satish K. 1987. Maximal conditions for transitivity under neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules. The Economic Studies Quarterly 38: 124–130.Google Scholar
  5. Jain, Satish K. 1988. Characterization of monotonicity and neutrality for binary Paretian social decision rules. Mathematical Social Sciences 15: 307–312.MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Salles, Maurice. 1975. A general possibility theorem for group decision rules with Pareto-transitivity. Journal of Economic Theory 11: 110–118.Google Scholar
  7. Sen, Amartya K., and Prasanta K. Pattanaik. 1969. Necessary and sufficient conditions for rational choice under majority decision. Journal of Economic Theory 1: 178–202.MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Formerly ProfessorJawaharlal Nehru UniversityNew DelhiIndia

Personalised recommendations