How Do You Catch Drug Smugglers in the Open Sea?

  • Javier Guerrero C.


As the seas have been increasingly used by drug smugglers, the Colombian Navy has played a central role in the interdiction of illicit drug flows. The author provides evidence of the many spaces in which the technologies and practices for interdiction are shaped. Long-term plans are an attempt to crystalise the role of the Navy as an able agency in the War on Drugs, there, visions and images of the enemy are entangled. During a Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO), the Navy personnel deploy diverse forms of knowledge. The patrol boat is key, and its qualities and characteristics are constantly reviewed and adjusted by the Navy personal in the field according to the perception of the enemy capabilities. Intelligence is crucial for the Navy actions, and helps to reduce uncertainty. The author argues that Ignorance Studies are useful to understand the paradoxical results of the Navy actions.


Maritime Interdiction Operations Intelligence Ignorance Studies War on Drugs 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Javier Guerrero C.
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Arts and HumanitiesInstituto Tecnológico MetropolitanoMedellínColombia

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