Economic Modernization and the Rise of Restricted Legislative Representation in China: A Case Study of Shenzhen

  • Chuanmin ChenEmail author
Part of the Emerging-Economy State and International Policy Studies book series (EESIPS)


How do we explain the resilience of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party in the process of economic modernization? Based on a case study of Shenzhen, this chapter reveals that economic modernization increases the legislative representation of the People’s Congresses by influencing the ideas, demands and capacities of the local authorities, officials, deputies, and society. Moreover, it also illustrates that the legislative representation in China is a form of restricted representation. Its development, on the one hand, improves the government’s responsiveness, thus relieving much of the social conflict and increasing the satisfaction with the government; on the other hand, it does not challenge the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, which is beneficial to regime consolidation in China.


Economic modernization China’s people’s congress Restricted representation 


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Political Science and Public AdministrationEast China University of Political Science and LawShanghaiChina

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