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Subgame Perfect Equilibrium-Based Framework for Counterterror Solution Modeling

  • Saurabh Ranjan SrivastavaEmail author
  • Yogesh Kumar Meena
  • Girdhari Singh
Conference paper
Part of the Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies book series (SIST, volume 141)

Abstract

Game theory is a potential tool to model strategic decision-making environments such as terrorism. Modeling the conflicting strategies of the terror groups and the suppressor governments or military, requires decision-making with a comprehensive estimation of the opponent’s behavior. This estimation is crucial for the formulation of efficient counterterror policies. This paper presents a sequential phased solution for military and government bodies to estimate the behavior of terror groups and plan own strategies accordingly by employing a game theoretic concept called subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The proposed solution is composed of five phases of counterterror combat. Each phase consists of iteratively repeated four different processes of action: negotiation, training, elimination, and rehabilitation. Our system recommends selection of an appropriate process by using fair or greedy strategies to maximize suppressor benefits and help ending the terror conflict.

Keywords

Subgame perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium Terrorism Military Recommendation Decision-making 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Saurabh Ranjan Srivastava
    • 1
    Email author
  • Yogesh Kumar Meena
    • 1
  • Girdhari Singh
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science & EngineeringMalaviya National Institute of Technology JaipurJaipurIndia

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