Advertisement

Mind and World: Naturalism vs. Non-naturalism

  • Ramesh Chandra Pradhan
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter continues the theme developed in the previous chapter to show that mind and world are metaphysically related in the way laid down by Kant and Hegel. It was Kant who first had shown that the world is structured by the categories of the mind. Hegel gave it a metaphysical grounding by showing that the world itself is an expression of the mind or the spirit.

John McDowell recently has taken up the Kantian and the Hegelian argument further by showing that the world is placed in the space of reasons and that there is no way we can place it beyond the realm of the conceptual because the latter is unbounded in nature. The world is independent of our empirical thought and experience, but it is within the space of reasons. Therefore, the world is empirically independent of the mind but is transcendentally dependent on mind.

McDowell develops a transcendental argument to show that the world and mind cannot be understood within a naturalist framework because naturalism, especially the reductive or bald naturalism, disenchants the mind and the world. The world gets its meaning from its place in the space of reasons; so also the mind being rational in nature is the source of the meanings and reasons.

Keywords

Bald naturalism Space of reasons Realm of law Rampant platonism Soft naturalism World Myth of the given 

References

  1. Bernstein, J. M. (2002a). Re-enchanting nature. In N. H. Smith (Ed.), Reading McDowell: On mind and world. London/New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  2. Bernstein, R. (2002b). McDowell’s domesticated Hegelianism. In N. H. Smith (Ed.), Reading McDowell: On mind and world. London/New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  3. Brandom, R. (2002). Non-inferential knowledge, perceptual experience, and secondary qualities: Placing McDowell’s empiricism. In N. H. Smith (Ed.), Reading McDowell: On mind and world. London/New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  4. Davidson, D. (2001). Subjective, intersubjective, objective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Descartes, R. (1912). Meditations on the first philosophy (J. Veitch, Trans.). London: J.M. Dent and Sons.Google Scholar
  6. Flanagan, O. (1992). Consciousness reconsidered. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  7. Friedman, M. (2002). Exercising the philosophical tradition. In N. H. Smith (Ed.), Reading McDowell: On mind and world. London/New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  8. Kant, I. (1929). The critique of pure reason (N. K. Smith, Trans.). London: MacMillan.Google Scholar
  9. McCulloch, G. (2002). Phenomenological externalism. In N. H. Smith (Ed.), Reading McDowell: On mind and world. London/New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  10. McCulloch, G. (1995). Mind and its world. London/New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  11. McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Pradhan, R. C. (2016). Mind and world: From soft naturalism to anti-naturalism. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 3(1), 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Putnam, H. (1999). The threefold cord: Mind, body and world. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Putnam, H. (2002). McDowell’s mind and McDowell’s world. In N. H. Smith (Ed.), Reading McDowell: On mind and world. London/New York.Google Scholar
  15. Rorty, R. (1982). The consequences of pragmatism. Sussex: Harvester Press.Google Scholar
  16. Sen, M. (2015). Externalism and the mental. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Wittgenstein, L. (1961). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (D. F. Pears, & B. F. McGuinness, Trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ramesh Chandra Pradhan
    • 1
  1. 1.Indian Institute of Advanced StudyShimlaIndia

Personalised recommendations