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Axial Shift pp 391-414 | Cite as

Case Study: The United States, Canada, and Australia

  • Benjamen GussenEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter continues to contextualize the analytical model in Chap.  9. The chapter illustrates the instability of federal orders by showing how they transition closer to unitary states in terms of the vertical division of power between federal and state (or provincial) governments. Focus is on the constitutional evolution in the three great Anglo-American federations, especially on the Commonwealth of Australia and how it compares to the United States and Canada. The construct of the residuum of powers is used to explain the evolution towards unitary states.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of LawSwinburne University of TechnologyMelbourneAustralia

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